We present an algorithmic conipositional verijkation inethodfur smart card applers atid controlpow based safety properties expressed in a modal logic with simultaneous greatest $xed poiiits. Our method builds on a techizique proposed by Grumberg and Lorig who use maximal models to reduce compositional verification of finite-state parallel processes to stamlard model checking. We adapt this technique to applets, a class of infinite-state sequential processes. This requires a refineinen1 of the method, since for a given applet inregace arid behavioural formula a maximal upplet does not always exist. We therefore propose a two-level approach, where local assumptions restrict the control flow structure of applets, while the global guarantee restricts the control Jow behaviour of the system. We presenr a izovel maximal model construction for our logic and then adapt it to applers. By separating die tasks of ver-$ring global and locai properties our method supports secure post-issuance loading of applers onto a snlQrl card. mediation of the card provider. Post-issuance loading opens many possibilities for new and powerful applications, but so far has not found its way to industrial practice, mainly because of security concerns. The method proposed here is a first step toward a framework for secure post-issuance loading of smart card appIets. Automatic checks are needed to ensure that new applets can be trusted. These checks can involve for example type safety, memory consumption, and illicit data or control flow.
Introduction
With the emergence of small secure devices, such as open platform smart cards? it becomes important to set criteria to decide whether an application can be accepted on a device. Since such devices are typically used to store privacy-sensitive data, for the acceptance of this new technology it is important that potential users have full trust in the protection of their data.
For the new generation of smart cards, an interesting possibility is to have posr-issuance loading of applications (applets). This means that once the card is issued and given to the user, new applets can be installed on the card without the correct, meaning that the local specification is sufficient to establish the global specification. Each time an applet is loaded post-issuance, an algorithm provided by the card issuer checks whether the applet implementation satisfies the required specification. An alternative scenario is that the card issuer only provides the global specification (and local specifications for its own applets), and leaves it to the applet provider to come up with an appropriate local specification for each post-issuance loaded applet. As in the previous scenario, an algorithm provided by the card issuer checks the applet against the local specification upon loading, but now also the property decomposition needs to be verified at loading time, potentially on-card.
Task (1) above is a manual one and requires some insight into the system, while the other two can be automated in our approach. We concentrate here on task (2); for task (3) standard algorithmic techniques exist. In earlier work [3], we explored deductive verification of correctness of decompositions based on a proof system. However, the generality of this approach requires considerable time and expertise from the user. Hence, an algorithmic method such as the one presented here is preferable in many situations.
The approach that we take is inspired by the pioneering work on automatic modular verification by Grumberg and Long [lo]. To check whether X : 4 t-X E B : 3 holds we replace X by a maximal model d (4) and then verify t-e(#) @ B : TJ algorithmically. The maximal model @(#) represents all models satisfying # in the sense that it simulates exactly those models and thus satisfies precisely the properties enjoyed by all these models. For this technique to be sound it is required that @ preserves simulation and that logical properties are preserved by simulation.
L .
Contributions Most existing work on compositional model checking focuses on the verification of parallel compositions of finite-state processes. Our main contribution is the adaptation of this technique to infinite-state sequential programs, more precisely to applets. We model applets by a collection of method control flow graphs equipped with an interface of provided and required methods. .Applet composition essentially forms the disjoint union of the respective collections of method graphs and allows the composed applets to communicate by method invocation. Our applet models induce a subclass of pushdown processes, with potentially infinite-state behaviour (cf. [SI). We are interested in safety properties, which can be adequately expressed in our simulation logic, a modal logic with simultaneous greatest fixed points. This logic is equivalent to the modal p-calculus [ 131 without diamond modalities and least fixed points. We establish a logical characterisation of simulation and, vice versa, a behavioural characterisation of logical satisfaction in terms of maximal models. In particular, we present a novel maximal model construction, consisting of a step-wise transformation of the formula into a semantically equivalent normal form, which is isomorphic to a maximal model for the formula.
When tailoring the maximal model technique to applets, we require that the maximal model for a given property is itself an applet. This ensures that, if the verification of Some additional results, examples and full proofs can be found in a technical report accompanying the present paper [19] . In a companion paper [12] we present a tool set for our framework and show its practical usability by applying it on an industrial electronic purse case study.
Related Work There is a wealth of methods for compositional verification of concurrent programs, most notably assumptionkommitment based reasoning about processes with synchronous message passing, and the rely/guarantee method for shared-variable concurrency. A systematic overview of these and related proof methods, some of which have been adapted to support algorithmic verification is given by de Roever et al. [9] . However, these techniques do not address programs with recursive procedures.
As an example of an approach to compositional verification based on [6] define maximal models for a co-recursive modal logic to express safety properties. Their logic has an expressive power sirnilar to ours, but is somewhat less standard as it includes a connective corresponding to non-deterministic choice.
The method of partial model checking introduced by An-
is based on a reduction procedure that removes the top-level operator from a process algebra term and computes a new property for the reduced term. To verify that the product P x Q of two processes has some property 4, the reduction "divides" the property 4 by Q to yield d/Q, which can be effectively computed only if Q is finite.
characterisation of satisfaction involves the construction of a model from a formula, which is nzaxirnal in the sense that it simulates all models satisfying the formula. This will serve as the basis for our compositional verification method for applets explained in the next section. For the rest of this section we fix two arbitrary finite sets of labels L and nromic propositions A, parameterising the models and logic introduced next.
Specifications and Simulation
First we define models, specifications and simulation. These notions are standard up to some minor variations. Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of a specification (where s1 (p, q) means X(s1) = { p , 4)).
Structure Section 2 defines models, simulation and logic, and describes a procedure to construct maximal models. Section 3 instantiates this to applets (both at structural and Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. Definition 2.3. (Simulation) A simularion is a binary relation R on S such that whenever (s, t> E R then X(s) = X ( t ) , and whenever s -% s' then there is some t' E S such
Simulation and Logic
This section develops several general results about simulation and its relation to logic. After the introduction of specifications and simulations between thcm, we present simulation logjc, a subset of Hennessy-miher logic i l l J extended with simultaneous greatest fixed points. By defining maps between specifications and logical formulae, we establish a logical characterisation of simulation in terms of simulation logic and, vice versa, a behavioural characterisation of logical satisfaction. In particular, the behavioural that t 4 t' and (s'. t') E R. We say that t simulates s, written s < t , if there is a simulation R such that (s, t ) E R. 
Simulation Logic
We define simulation logic in two steps: first we define a basic logic and then we add recursion by using modal equation systems. Let V be a countably infinite set of propo- is monotone.
We would like to determine the semantics of this formula with respect to the specification S in Figure 1 . Simulation logic is equally expressive as the modal pcalculus 1131 without diamond modalities and least fixed points. The translation from this fragment of the modal pcalculus to simulation logic is straightforward and replaces each fixed point by an equation. As an example, the for-
of simulation logic. The translation in the other direction is based on BekiE's principle (cf: [2]), which expresses a fixed point in a product lattice in terms of a vector of componentwise fixed points.
Representation Results
Next, we relate simulation logic to simulakion by defining two functions, x and 8. The map x translates eachfiriite specification into a formula, while 0 translates formulae into (finite) specifications. The latter map is first defined on formulae in so-called simulation normal form (SNF) and then extended to all formulae by showing that any formulacan be transformed into an equivalent one in SNE We show that x logically characterises simulation and 0 behaviourally characterises logical satisfaction. These two maps form a Galois connection between finite specifications ordered by simulation and formulae ordered by logical consequence. Similar results for somewhat different settings appear in [7, 15, 63 . In this paper, we present a novel procedure 0 to construct maximal models. While its complexity is exponential in the worst case, it avoids by its transformational nature some unnecessary exponential blowups occurring in the respective procedures for the universal fragments of CTL 11. 01 and CTL* [14] .
Characteristic Formulae
First we define the mapping from finite specifications to formulae. A finite specification ( M , E ) is translated into its characteristic formula x ( M , E ) = $=[EM], where 4~ = VsEE X , and EM defines X , for each s E S by Recall that v 0 = ff (false) and r\ 0 = tt (true). 
We can prove that if specification SI is simulated by the finite specification S2, this is cquivalent to saying that SI satisfies the characteristic formula of S2. This is a variation of an earlier result by Larsen [ 151.
Theorem 2.7. Let SI, Sz be specificarions and suppose s 2 isfinite. TheH SI 5 S, ifand only ifs, /= x(S2).
Note that using infinite equation systems this theorem generalises to finitely branching S2.
Maximal Models
The next step is to define the inverse mapping. Not all formulae correspond directly to a specification, but those in simulation normal form do. 
Since X is not split into several equations, X = {X} re- 
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Finally, it is worth noting that all results can be transferred to the setting of weak simulation and logic {see [19] ). thus phase I eventually terminates.
Compositional Verification of Applets
Having so far developed our results for arbitrary specifications, we shall now concentrate on a particular application, namely, the representation of applets (i.e. smart card applications) as specifications. We study sequential (single-threaded) applets and safety properties of their interprocedural control flow. As explained above, we are interested in the decomposition of properties, in order to guarantee the secure post-issuance loading of applets. We do this by instantiating the general framework of the previous section on two different levels: { 1) the structural level, where a specification represents the control flow graph of an applet, and (2) the behavioural level, where a specification represents the behaviour of an applet. This yields a version of simulation and simulation logic for each level. We develop a compositional verification principle, where assumptions about individuaI applets are stated in the structural simulation Iogic and properties of the composed system are expressed in the behavioural logic.
Applets
We model the control structure of an appIet as a collection of method specifications. However, for compositional reasoning about applets, we need to know which methods exist andlor are used. Therefore, we first define the notion of an applet interface. Let Meth be an infinite set of method names not containing the special symbols T-and E. We say I is closed if I -I + . The composition of two interfaces 11 = (I?, 1;) and I2 = (1z,IT) is defined by Next, we define method specifications, which are the basic building blocks of applets. The definition requires that each provided method m E I* of an applet A : I has to be impiemented in a method graph for m. The interface of an applet can be derived from its implementation: a straightforward induction shows that if A is an applet built from a model over L and A then its interface is (A -{T}, L -( E } ) . We write S : I for an arbitrary specification S to mean that S is (isomorphic to) an applet with interface I. Note that, up to isomorphism, kl is associative and commutative with neutral element Om.
Structural Level
Structural simulation on applets coincides with simulation on the specifications defining applets. For convenience we write dl ss A 2 instead of AI 5 A2 to denote structural simulation. Structural simulation is preserved by applet composition. 
The formula +J[C~J axiomatises the basic structure of an applet with interface I , namely, each initial node belongs to a unique method m and no transition leaves m. Note that CI is not in SNF (proposition T is missing). The specifications satisfying $1 are essentially the applets with interface I as we will show below. Using the characteristic formula for interfaces, we can define maximal applets. 
0
Point (i) of the theorem essentially expresses that the formula $1 characterises those specifications that are applets with interface I, while point (ii) extends Theorem 2.15 from specifications to applets. As a consequence of (ii) we have BJ($) 41 and f3,(4) : I, since all nodes of e,(#> are reachable by construction.
Behavioural Level
Next, we change our focus to the behavioural level, where we first define the operational semantics of a closed applet. Since our compositional method uses structural assumptions, there is no need to compose applets on the behavioural level, so an operational semantics of closed applets is sufficient. In contrast, in previous work on semiautomatic compositional applet verification [3] , the use of behavioural assumptions required a more involved open semantics of applets. [ 191) .
Example
To demonstrate the use of our approach in practice, we present a small example, which is a highly distilled version of a larger case study on the verification of security properties for an electronic purse, We refer the interested reader to [ 121 for more details, including a more detailed motivation of why this kind of security properties are important for smart card applications and how they can be formalised.
Suppose 
The equations defining Y and X,, are handled in a similar way. The only step that has some effect is step 5, which introduces the missing literal T . More interesting is to look how Phase I is applied to the new equation U = Y A X-,. Figure 3 displays the maximal applet corresponding to this equation system (in its left column). It also shows the maximal applet for ad, found in a similar way.
Conclusions
We propose an algorithmic compositional verification method for control flow based safety properties of smart card applets, where local assumptions on individual applets are structural, while global guarantees are behavioural.
Safety properties are adequately expressed in our simulation logic, a modal logic with simultaneous greatest fixed points. We establish representation results connecting Iogical satisfaction to simulation in a general setting, including a characterisation of logical satisfaction in terms of maximal models. Our novel maximal model construction transforms the formula into an equivalent simulation normal form, isomorphic to a maximal model.
For compositional applet verification we define maximal applets at the structural level as the maximal model of the local structural property restricted by a formula characterising the given interface. From these results and the fact that structural simulation implies behavioural simulation, we derive a sound and complete compositional method, reducing the correctness of property decompositions to a model checking problem for pushdown processes and thus extending existing compositional techniques for finite-state systems to a useful class of infinite-state systems.
The companion paper [I21 presents a tool set that we have developed and applied to an industrial electronic purse case study to demonstrate the practical applicability of the approach, Section 4 contains a highly distilled version of this work. It is noteworthy that, in the present setting, the method supports secure post-issuance loading of applets, but it couId be applied to any type of sequential programs with recursive procedures for which compositional verification of control flow properties is desired.
There are several possible directions for future work, including (i) adding diamond modalities to the simulation logic, (ii) refining the notion of interface, by defining public and private interfaces, and (iii) investigating under what restrictions the proposed method can be adapted to allow behavioural assumptions in place of structural ones.
